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This study aims at determining the effectiveness of board meeting 
frequency on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting by 
public listed companies on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia. A 
CSR reporting index consisting of 51 items was developed based 
on six themes: General, Community, Environment, Human 
Resource, Marketplace and Other. A content analysis was used to 
determine the extent of CSR reporting. An Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) regression was employed in determining the association 
between board meeting frequency and CSR reporting.  The finding 
of the study is that advising tendency (frequency of board 
meetings) is not associated with CSR reporting. Overall this study 
strengthens the idea that advising tendency of the board is 
essential to companies in order to safeguard all stakeholders’ 
interests. Accordingly, regulators and policymakers should be 
more stringent in monitoring company’s conformance towards 
regulations. This study provides a new avenue of knowledge and 
contributes to the literature on the practices of the board of 
directors and corporate social responsibility reporting in the 
context of a semi-developed country. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting has 
received increased attention from corporate sectors 
as it exhibits to stakeholders a company’s 
accountability and transparency. The relevance and 
reliability of CSR information reported by companies 
are very much influenced by the company’s various 
internal governance mechanisms (Karamanou and 
Vafeas, 2005). Effective corporate governance 
ensures that management acts in the interest of 
shareholders including CSR reporting. Following 
mega corporate collapses around the world 
company operation and its relevant reporting, 
including CSR reporting, has attracted a renewed 
attention to all the stakeholders. 
Much of the empirical literature is concentrated 
in a few developed countries (Vafeas, 1999; Kent and 
Stewart, 2008). However, due to differences in 
institutional contexts, legal and corporate 
governance practices in developing countries, 
variations in company CSR reporting are expected. 
Directors in developed countries normally opt for 
better CSR practices as a way of promoting their 
undiversified human capital and also to increase 
share price, thus maximising shareholders’ returns. 
Nevertheless, since considering stakeholders’ 
welfare and interests has become part of directors’ 
fiduciary responsibility, directors who fail to 
practise CSR is likely to face legal actions (Devinney 
et. al., 2013). Nonetheless, with various benefits of 
CSR, the practice is currently on the rise. Besides, 
better-governed companies are often associated with 
better CSR practices (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). 
Hence, conducting this study will provide a better 
understanding of the effectiveness of board meeting 
on enhancing company CSR reporting. 
Malaysia provides a good setting for 
investigating the relationship between reporting and 
corporate governance attributes because its legal 
system is reasonably well developed but surrounded 
by limited information environment (Ball et al., 
2003). Malaysia is a semi-developed country that has 
a CSR Framework promulgated by Bursa Malaysia in 
2007. It is a voluntary self–regulated model for 
existing PLCs. Thus, based on a different governance 
landscape, it is expected that the variation in CSR 
reporting in Malaysia is likely to be attributed to 
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corporate governance following the revisions of the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) in 
2007 and 2012. Meanwhile, an earlier revision of 
MCCG in 2007 recommends frequent board 
meetings as one of the best practices. It keeps the 
board engaged in the company’s operations besides 
connecting with other directors. Based on the 
emphasis given by the regulator on the board 
meeting, it clearly demonstrates the importance of 
board meeting in assisting companies to achieve 
their objectives. This would include meeting their 
social responsibilities towards stakeholders. Hence, 
this study is carried out with the aim of 
investigating the effect of the board of directors 
meeting on the extent of CSR reporting of PLCs in 
Malaysia. 
Against the backdrop of current efforts to 
regulate the structure and functions of corporate 
boards, results of this study are likely to be of 
interest to policy makers because they believe that 
certain board attributes are systematically 
associated with the quality of reporting. Secondly, 
these results extend academic research by enhancing 
the understanding of the connection between CSR 
reporting and board of directors, and, more 
generally, by providing additional evidence on the 
role of corporate governance mechanisms in aligning 
the interest of management and shareholders. 
Finally, the results can be potentially valuable to 
directors because their credibility in making good 
decisions during a board meeting is indirectly being 
assessed. Generally, this study proposes a potential 
path for directors wishing to enhance the quality 
and credibility of their CSR reporting. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as 
follows. The next section discusses the literature 
review and development of a hypothesis. The third 
section briefly explores corporate governance and 
CSR reporting in Malaysia. This is followed by a 
discussion on the theoretical framework. The fifth 
section describes the research method. The results 
of this study are reported in the sixth section while 
in the final section conclusions are drawn and 
implications of the results are discussed. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
HYPOTHESIS 
 
Arguably, the directors of the company should meet 
regularly as all decisions can be made after thorough 
discussion, fruitful debates and detailed analysis. 
When boards hold regular meetings, they are more 
likely to remain informed and knowledgeable about 
the relevant performance of the company leading 
them to take or influence and direct the appropriate 
action to address the issue (Ponnu and Karthigeyan, 
2010). Vafeas (1999) suggested that the number of 
board meetings attended is actually a very good 
proxy for directors’ monitoring effort. The frequent 
board meeting is also expected to be a remedy to the 
problem of limited director interaction. This applies 
to the independent directors who have limited 
interaction time to perform their monitoring role. 
This opinion is reinforced by criticisms of directors 
who spread their time too thin by taking on too 
many outside directorships, confounding their 
ability to attend meetings regularly and, therefore, 
to monitor management well (Vafeas, 1999). A clear 
implication of this is that directors in boards who 
meet more frequently are more likely to perform 
their duties in accordance with shareholders' 
interests. Boards of directors need to be active to 
meet their corporate governance commitments, 
particularly in ensuring high quality and transparent 
reporting in annual reports (Kent and Stewart, 2008). 
The notion is that an active board may be a better 
monitor than the inactive board.  Additionally, 
frequent meetings interacted with informal sideline 
communications can create and strengthen cohesive 
bonds among directors (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). 
This contributes to effective collaboration among 
directors and better company performance. Taken 
together, boards that meet frequently are more 
likely to perform their duties diligently and 
effectively (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Vafeas, 1999). 
While many agreed that diligent boards are 
likely to enhance the oversight level of company’s 
reporting, there seems to be no consensus on the 
frequency of meeting. It must be acknowledged that 
useful decision control is unlikely to occur if 
meetings take place only once per year or no 
meetings at all are held (Menon and Williams, 1994). 
Hahn and Lasfer (2015) suggest that the frequency 
of board meetings to be a function of company-
specific factors, namely, remuneration, company 
performance, complexity, financial distress, and 
corporate governance. The agency and stewardship, 
theories suggest that board meeting frequency is 
correlated with challenges. Companies with greater 
scale, more diversified activities, and/or larger staff 
are likely to have more monitoring and advisory 
needs and require more board meetings. Similarly, 
during crisis times, the board of directors tend to 
increase meeting frequency (Hahn and Lasfer, 2015). 
Market performance and investor issues, are also 
expected to influence boards of directors to act, and 
such action may increase, or decrease, their meeting 
frequency (Vafeas, 1999). For instance, weakening 
company dynamics may require immediate board 
consent or approval on key strategic issues, hence 
demanding increased full board meetings. Vafeas 
(1999) argue that company’s performance is an 
important determinant of the board meeting, as 
poor prior performance increases the need for 
monitoring to turn around the company. Vafeas 
(1999) and Raheja (2005) propose that, as boards 
become more independent, their meeting frequency 
increases to reflect the need to access information 
by other channels and the increased efforts needed 
for information coordination. However, to date, the 
appropriate number of board meetings still remains 
a question. The code on corporate governance such 
as Cadbury Report 1993 and MCCG 2007 propose 
that companies self-determine their board meeting 
frequencies according to their monitoring and 
advising needs. As a result, the number of board 
meetings selected by a company appears to be a 
random event as boards chose different meeting 
frequencies. Hahn and Lasfer (2015)'s study seem to 
suggest that board meeting frequency is becoming 
less distinctive to the company and seemingly 
determined as a more convenient or publicly 
acceptable number.  
Despite the collective agreement that active 
monitoring through board meeting enhances 
company’s performance including reporting, 
research on this issue contains contradicting 
arguments. Jensen (1993) considers board meetings 
not necessarily useful due to the limited time 
independent directors spend with the company and 
consider such time could be better utilised for a 
more meaningful exchange of ideas with the 
management. Besides, routine tasks absorb much of 
the meetings, limiting opportunities for independent 
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directors to exercise meaningful control over 
management. Companies are also likely to limit the 
board meeting frequency because it is a costly 
monitoring alternative (Vafeas, 1999) involving 
managerial time and increase travel expenses, 
administrative support requirements and directors’ 
meeting fees. This may affect enterprise activities 
within the companies as resources are being 
channelled towards less productive activities (Evans 
et al., 2002). A study conducted by Johl (2006) in the 
U.K among the FTSE 100 companies found there was 
a negative relationship between the frequency of 
board meetings and entrepreneurial activities in 
companies. In support of less number of the board 
meeting, Jensen (1993) contends that establishing a 
system that can respond to specific challenges is 
likely to be more profitable for boards in well-
functioning companies. Since this type of companies 
normally exhibits little conflict, directors can 
increase the frequency of meetings during a crisis or 
when shareholders’ interests are visibly in danger 
(Ntim and Osei, 2013). 
The issue on board meeting has attracted the 
attention of many researchers. A review of prior 
studies reveals the association of board meetings 
with various elements such as company’s earnings 
management (Xie et al., 2003); financial reporting 
(Kent and Stewart, 2008); company fraud (Uzun et 
al., 2004) and also company performance (Chou et 
al., 2013; Vafeas, 1999). However, the literature is 
inconsistent. Vafeas (1999) found empirical evidence 
that boards meet more frequently after crises and 
that performance increases as a result. He suggests 
that board meeting frequency is a proxy for the time 
directors have to monitor management. However, it 
is not clear as to whether the frequent board 
meetings represent increased monitoring efforts or 
more of educating the independent directors. Brick 
and Chidambaran (2010) confirmed that companies 
holding more board and committee meetings tend to 
have greater value. Francis et al. (2015) indicated 
that companies with poor board attendance at 
meetings perform significantly worse than boards 
which have good attendance during the financial 
crisis. Ntim and Osei (2013) in South Africa also 
suggested similar findings between the frequency of 
board meetings and corporate performance where 
boards that meet more frequently tend to generate 
higher financial performance. Boards that meet more 
frequently have increased capacity to effectively 
advise, monitor and discipline management, and 
thereby improving corporate financial performance. 
Uzun et al. (2004) did not find a significant relation 
between financial reporting fraud and the meeting 
frequency of board and audit committee. With 
regard to the disclosure practices, a positive 
association between the board frequency of meeting 
and disclosure on the executive compensation 
practices has been reported by Laksmana (2008). In 
the same vein, Allegrini and Greco (2013) agreed on 
the fact that both the boards and the audit 
committees’ diligence are positively associated with 
voluntary disclosure. Examining Australian 
companies’ attitude on financial disclosure following 
the introduction of AIFRS, Kent and Stewart (2008) 
found that companies with more frequent board and 
audit committee meetings tend to have more 
disclosure about the impact of AIFRSs. On the 
contrary, Haji (2013) failed to find any significant 
relationship between a board meeting and 
sustainability reporting of Malaysian PLCs., 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) have concluded there 
is no relation between the activity of the board and 
the quality of financial information disclosed. 
In short, a board meeting is one of the 
mechanisms that directors can utilise to collectively 
decide and determine the direction of the company, 
resolve any arising problem, taking strategic action, 
review the performance of the company and 
oversights the company’s operation. It is seemingly 
the right platform for directors to discharge their 
responsibility effectively and thus increasing 
company performance. With CSR issues becoming 
increasingly important, the board meetings is likely 
to be associated with more CSR duties, such as CSR 
reporting. Therefore, based on the reviewed 
literature, it is hypothesised that: 
H1: Frequency of board meeting is positively 
associated with company CSR reporting. 
 
3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CSR 
REPORTING IN MALAYSIA 
 
The MCCG was released in March 2000. The core of 
MCCG is to achieve excellence in corporate 
governance through strengthening self and market 
discipline and promoting good compliance and 
corporate governance culture. In 2007, the Code was 
revamped. It explicitly recommends that the board 
should meet frequently, with due notice of issues to 
be discussed and should record its conclusions. 
However, the frequency of board meeting depends 
very much on company’s interpretation and 
requirement. Further to that, the Code also requires 
the company to disclose the number of board 
meetings held in a year together with the details of 
attendance of each individual director in respect of 
meetings held. These are viewed as evidence of the 
directors’ accountability towards shareholders.  
A second revision was made in 2012. It 
emphasises the importance of the board in ensuring 
the company’s strategies promote sustainability 
especially in the area of environmental, social and 
governance. It is also required of companies to 
disclose policies pertaining to sustainability and its 
implementation in the annual report and corporate 
website. As a result, there is consistent growth in 
CSR practices in Malaysia although there are still 
sharp differences in reporting outcomes across 
companies. Companies are allowed to report 
information they think is appropriate and useful to 
stakeholders based on the themes outlined by the 
Bursa Malaysia CSR framework. Overall, this 
phenomenon appears to suggest the link between 
the good practice of corporate governance and the 
level of CSR reporting. 
 
4. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT  
 
Various theories have been used to explain the 
association between advising tendency of the board 
or board meeting frequency and company disclosure 
practices; among others is resource dependence 
theory. The resource dependence theory rests on the 
notion that board of directors are a key resource to 
a company (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Accordingly, 
they are expected to bring different types of 
resources to the companies. Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003) introduce the concept of board capital as the 
sum of individual directors’ human and social 
capital and use board capital as a proxy for a 
board’s ability to monitor and provide resources for 
company strategy. de Villiers, Naiker and van Staden 
(2011) assert that directors who are resource rich, 
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for instance through multiple directorship, being 
experts in their fields, or having long-term director 
experience, have more human and social capital. On 
the same vein, Kor and Sundaramurthy (2009) 
believe that human capital can be developed through 
education, training, and experience. Hillman and 
Dalziel (2003) note that board capital is needed for 
effective resource monitoring and provision because 
it provides four benefits discussed by Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978): (1) advice and counsel, (2) legitimacy 
and reputation, (3) channels of communication and 
information between the company and external 
organizations, and (4) resources from important 
elements outside the company. Inevitably, the board 
of directors plays an important advisory role in 
corporate strategic decisions. Through the provision 
of advice and social support to the CEO as well as 
counsel to the company, the board of directors can 
enhance the strategic decision-making process. 
Boards are anticipated to review and evaluate 
analyses and proposed changes in company 
strategies. By actively involved in the formulation 
and implementation steps, they contribute directly 
to better strategic decision making (Chen, 2014). 
As explained earlier, boards of directors are 
groups of competent people that help managers to 
enhance their decision-making process. Through 
their experiences, competencies and different 
viewpoints, they are able to contribute to the 
boardroom debate. With a critical attitude and a 
willingness to ask the management discerning 
questions during board meetings allows board 
members to exert effective behavioural and strategic 
control (Huse, 2005). Critical debate facilitates the 
exchange of diverse information among the board 
members, thus enhance decision quality. 
Consequently, this may lead the CEO to provide 
more detailed information and explanations on his 
conduct and decision-making. Apart from that, the 
critical debate may be perceived by the CEO as a 
signal of board power, and the CEO may thus be 
more prone to prepare the information needed 
before meetings and to take into account the 
interests of shareholders (Chen, 2014). Clearly, this 
contributes to a better board monitoring 
performance. With a frequent board meeting, 
competent directors are able to use their expertise in 
assisting the management to make better decisions 
that are beneficial to both the company as well as 
shareholders. Moreover, it is the responsibility of the 
board of directors to meet and safeguard the 
interests of shareholders. 
 
Table 1. Sample of company characteristics 
 
No Sector Number of firms in the sample Observed firm years Observation in % 
1 Agricultural Production - Crops 25 150 5.56 
2 Agricultural Production - Livestock 5 30 1.11 
3 Fishing, Hunting and Trapping 1 6 0.22 
4 Metal Mining 3 18 0.67 
5 Oil and Gas Extraction 4 24 0.89 
6 Food and Kindered Products 32 192 7.11 
7 Tobacco Products 1 6 0.22 
8 Textile Mill Products 2 12 0.44 
9 Apparel and Other Textile Products 8 48 1.78 
10 Lumber and Wood Products 25 150 5.56 
11 Furniture and Fixtures 13 78 2.89 
12 Paper and Allied Products 19 114 4.22 
13 Printing and Publishing 7 42 1.56 
14 Chemicals and Allied Products 11 66 2.44 
15 Petroleum and Coal Products 4 24 0.89 
16 Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products 18 108 4.00 
17 Leather and Leather Products 1 6 0.22 
18 Stone, Clay and Glass Products 21 126 4.67 
19 Primary Metal Industries 23 138 5.11 
20 Fabricated Metal Products 6 36 1.33 
21 Industrial, Machinery and Equipment 15 90 3.33 
22 Electronic and Other Electric Equipment 24 144 5.33 
23 Transportation Equipment 11 66 2.44 
24 Misc. Manufacturing Industries 23 138 5.11 
25 Electricity, Gas and Sanitary Services 5 30 1.11 
26 General Building Contractors 21 126 4.67 
27 Heavy Construction, Ex. Building 14 84 3.11 
28 Wholesale Trade- Durable Goods 11 66 2.44 
29 Wholesale Trade- Non-Durable Goods 9 54 2.00 
30 General Merchandise Stores 4 24 0.89 
31 Food Stores 1 6 0.22 
32 Automotive Dealers and Service Stations 3 18 0.67 
33 Apparel and Accessory Stores 2 12 0.44 
34 Eating and Drinking Places 1 6 0.22 
35 Hotels and Other Lodging Places 8 48 1.78 
36 Trucking and Warehousing 4 24 0.89 
37 Water Transportation 11 66 2.44 
38 Transportation By Air 1 6 0.22 
39 Transportation Services 6 36 1.33 
40 Communications 7 42 1.56 
41 Real Estate 11 66 2.44 
42 Business Services 18 108 4.00 
43 Educational Services 1 6 0.22 
44 Health Services 8 48 1.78 
45 Amusement and Recreational Services 2 12 0.44 
 
Total 450 2700 100.00 
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5. METHODS 
 
5.1. Data 
 
The sample of this study is taken from non-financial 
companies listed on the Main Market of Bursa 
Malaysia. This study spans from 2008 until 2013 
which permits an investigation of CSR reporting 
trends in Malaysia. The company must be 
continuously listed on Bursa Malaysia for each year 
in the six-year period as well as producing an annual 
report within the stipulated time. There were 813 
companies listed on the Main Market as at 31st 
December 2013. However, only 613 companies met 
the criteria. In this study, 136 finance companies 
were excluded from the sample along with 27 
companies with incomplete data. 450 companies 
were finally included in this study as demonstrated 
in Table 1.  
 This study relies on panel data which provides 
multiple observations on each company in the 
sample. Panel data usually give the researcher a 
large number of data points, increasing the degrees 
of freedom and reducing the collinearity among 
explanatory variables (Hsiao, 2007). These 
advantages help to improve the efficiency of 
econometric estimates. It also allows controlling for 
omitted (unobserved or mismeasured) variables 
(Hsiao, 2007). More importantly, panel data allows a 
researcher to analyse a number of important 
economic questions that cannot be addressed using 
cross-sectional or time-series data sets. Given these 
advantages, this study uses panel data based on its 
ability to portray more reliable company CSR 
reporting trends (Sartawi et. al., 2014).  
 
5.2. Variable definitions 
 
5.2.1. Dependent variable 
 
In measuring the extent of CSR reporting, content 
analysis was applied in this study. Many earlier 
studies (e.g. Chan et al., 2014; Abdullah et al., 2011; 
Haji, 2013) opted this technique to investigate CSR 
reporting. Content analysis is a technique to 
measure objectively and systematically the content 
of communication (Naser et. al., 2006). This 
technique changes information disclosed in annual 
reports into scores using qualitative and quantitative 
methods (Djajadikerta and Trireksani, 2012). 
A checklist of items was constructed by 
examining previous CSR reporting checklists (e.g. 
Barako and Brown, 2008). Additionally, specific 
Malaysian checklists were also referenced (e.g. 
Abdullah et al., 2011; Haji, 2013) apart from the 
framework launched by Bursa Malaysia in 2006. The 
focus of the framework was fourfold: Environment, 
Community, Marketplace and Workplace. The 
content under each heading is left to management 
discretion. For the purpose of this study, a checklist 
of 22 items of CSR developed by Abdullah et al. 
(2011) has been made as the benchmark. This 
checklist was used to measure CSR reporting index 
of companies in Malaysia during 2007. Their 
checklist was an adoption of the work of Mohd 
Ghazali (2007) with some changes according to the 
checklists by Ng (1985). The final checklist 
containing 51 items is in Table 2. 
A dichotomous procedure is used to compute a 
disclosure score for each company.  Each disclosure 
item is assigned a score of “1” if it is disclosed and 
“0” if it is not disclosed.  This measurement would 
address the presence or absence of CSR information 
(Mohd Ghazali, 2007) and has been extensively 
employed previously (e.g. Haji, 2013; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2005; Rashid and Lodh, 2008). The disclosure 
scores of each company were divided by the 
maximum possible score (i.e. 1 x 51= 51) to arrive at 
CSR index. This approach has been commonly 
applied by many scholars of this area. 
 
CSRI  =  
j
nj
t ij
n
X 1
 (1) 
 
Where: CSRI = CSR reporting index; nj = number 
of items expected for jth company; Xij = 1 if ith item 
disclosed; 0 if ith item not disclosed. 
 
5.2.2. Independent and control variables 
 
The independent variable is the frequency of board 
meetings. The board meeting is often held at a 
definite interval to consider policy issues and major 
problems. Claimed to be a proxy for board diligence, 
it is a decisive dimension to improve the 
effectiveness of a board and the level of monitoring 
activity delivered (Laksmana, 2008). The frequency 
of board meetings (BFREQUENCY) is measured as the 
natural logarithm of a number of the board meeting 
held throughout the financial year. This is following 
the study by Ntim and Osei (2011). 
Numerous studies have shown that CSR 
reporting is influenced by various governance 
attributes and company’s characteristics. Hence, to 
eliminate their impact on the level of reporting, this 
study considered board independence, board size, 
directors’ ownership, debt ratio, liquidity, company 
age, company size, profitability, company growth 
and market capitalization as control variables. As 
per Bursa Malaysia, 2006 board independence refers 
to independent directors who have no affiliation 
with the company except for their directorship.  As 
such, they have an important impact on monitoring 
activities (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Independent 
directors are also presumed to put the company’s 
best interest ahead of their personal best interest. 
Accordingly, they act as effective agents of change. 
With the anticipation that independent directors 
represent the interest of shareholders and 
stakeholders, they might have considerable 
influence on CSR reporting (Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005). This study referred board independence 
(BIND) to the number of independent directors on 
the board relative to the total number of directors. 
This is consistent with the work of Arora and 
Dharwadkar (2011), and Das et al. (2015).Board size 
refers to the number of directors to make up the 
board (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Board size 
(BSIZE) is defined as the natural logarithm of a total 
number of directors as used by Rashid (2013). 
Allegedly, directors’ ownership determines their 
willingness to monitor managers and enhances 
shareholders’ value (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). It 
motivates directors to do their monitoring job 
effectively. Directors’ ownership (DIROWN) is 
expressed as the ratio of total director 
shareholdings to a total number of shares. This is 
consistent with Bathala and Rao (1995) and Rashid 
(2013). 
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Table 2. CSR reporting checklist 
 
CSR Reporting Items 
A General (maximum 7 scores) 
1 Acknowledgement or management of corporate social responsibility 
2 Disclosure of corporate objectives or policies with regard to corporate social responsibility 
3 Company’s strategy for addressing sustainability 
4 Mission/ values/ codes of conduct relevant to CSR topics 
5 Commitments to external initiatives (e.g. membership) 
6 Awards received relating to social, environmental and best practices 
7 Discussion on stakeholder engagement 
B Community (maximum 9 scores) 
8 
Charitable donations and activities (such as donations of cash, products or employee services to support established 
community activities, events, organisations, education and the arts) 
9 
Supporting government/ non-governmental organisation campaign (such as supporting national pride/government-
sponsored campaigns) 
10 Support for public health/ volunteerism (such as blood donation, sponsoring public health or recreational projects) 
11 Aid medical research 
12 
Sponsoring educational programs/ scholarship (such as sponsoring educational conferences, seminars or art exhibits, 
funding scholarship programs or activities) 
13 Discussion on public policy involvement 
14 Graduate employment 
15 Sponsoring sports project 
16 Acquisition from local suppliers 
C Environment (maximum 14 scores) 
17 Statements indicating that pollution from operations have been or will be reduced 
18 Discussion on recycling efforts (such as recycled inputs/ recycled waste) 
19 Preventing waste 
20 Disclosure on significant spills/ environmental accidents 
21 Hazardous waste disclosure 
22 Fines/ sanction for non-compliance 
23 
Design facilities that are harmonious with the environment/ landscaping (such as contributions in terms of cash or 
art/sculptures to beautify the environment, restoring historical buildings and structures) 
24 Impacts on biodiversity 
25 
Strategies/ plans for managing impacts on biodiversity (such as wildlife conservation, protection of the environment, e.g., 
pest controls) 
26 
Environmental review and audit (such as reference to environmental review, scoping, audit, and assessment including 
independent attestation) 
27 
Conservation of energy in the conduct of business operations ( using energy more efficiently during the manufacturing 
process) 
28 Utilising waste materials for energy production 
29 Disclosure of carbon/ green gas emissions 
30 Initiatives to reduce carbon/ green gas emissions 
D Workplace (maximum 14 scores) 
31 
Employee profiles (such as number of employees in the company and/or at each branch/ subsidiary,  information on the 
qualifications and experience of employees recruited) 
32 Employee appreciation (such as information on purchase scheme/ pension program) 
33 
Discussion of significant benefit program provided (such as remuneration, providing staff accommodation or ownership 
schemes ) 
34 Employee training (such as  through in-house training, establishing training centres) 
35 
Support to employee education (such as giving financial assistance to employees in educational institutions; continuing 
education courses) 
36 
Information on management-employee relationship/ efforts to improve job satisfaction (such as providing information 
about communication with employees on management styles and management programs which may directly affect the 
employees) 
37 
Employee diversity (such as disclosing the percentage or number of minority and/or women employees in the workforce 
and/or in the various managerial levels) 
38 Employee receiving regular reviews 
39 Recreational activities/ facilities 
40 Establishment of a safety department/ committee/ policy 
41 Provision of health care for employee 
42 Compliance to health and safety standards and regulations 
43 Award for health and safety 
44 Rates of work-related injury/ illness/ deaths (such as disclosing accident statistics) 
E Marketplace (maximum 5 scores) 
45 
Information on any research project set up by the company to improve its products in any way (such as the 
amount/percentage figures of research and development expenditure and/or its benefits) 
46 Verifiable information that the quality of the firm’s products has increased (such as ISO9000) 
47 Disclosure of products meeting applicable safety standards (such as information on the safety of the firm’s product) 
48 Product sustainability/ use of child labour 
49 Customer service improvements/ awards/ ratings 
F Other (maximum 2 scores) 
50 Value added statements 
51 Value added ratios 
 
There are mixed results pertaining to leverage 
in relation to CSR reporting.  On the one hand, 
Barnea and Rubin (2010) believed that the need for 
managers of highly leveraged companies to generate 
and retain cash to service the debt might reduce 
their ability to fund CSR activities. Their study 
suggests a negative relationship between leverage 
and CSR disclosure. On the other hand, companies 
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with high debt levels are expected to incur high 
monitoring costs. Alternatively, they disclose more 
information to reduce the costs (Esa and Mohd 
Ghazali, 2012) and to meet the needs of their 
lenders (Abdullah et al., 2011). Following Wan Abd 
Rahman et al. (2011), leverage (DR) was measured by 
the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  
Highly liquid companies have stronger 
incentives to communicate more information to the 
public as compared to companies with lower 
liquidity. Company liquidity (LIQ) is measured as a 
current ratio (Rashid, 2013, 2014).Company age 
(AGE) was represented by the number of years it has 
been listed on Bursa Malaysia, expressed in natural 
logarithm (Rashid,2009). The level of CSR reporting 
escalates as company age increases. Khan et. al. 
(2013) point out that a more mature company is 
likely to report more on CSR activities due to its 
reputational apprehension. Meanwhile, many 
researchers agree that both company size and the 
extent of disclosures made for information users are 
closely linked.  Among others, studies by Cormier et 
al. (2011) confirmed that size is one of the major 
factors determining CSR reporting. Availability of 
money and expertise in large companies enable 
them to engage in more activities (including CSR 
activities), produce more information on these 
activities and their implications, and bear the cost of 
such processes (Andrew et al., 1989). This study 
employed natural logarithm of total assets as the 
proxy for company size (SIZE) consistent with Das et 
al. (2015), Sartawi et al. (2014) and Rashid (2014). 
CSR practices are also associated with 
profitability. Highly profitable companies have the 
ability to bear CSR costs, hence disseminate more 
information to the stakeholders. Profitability was 
proxied by Return on Assets (ROA) following Rashid 
(2014) and Sartawi et al. (2014).  When companies 
grow rapidly, they tend to seek outside financing. 
This creates an obligation to the companies to 
provide better disclosure to fulfil the financial 
providers’ demand (Naser et al., 2006). Alongside, 
growth companies are also believed to have greater 
information asymmetry and agency costs (Eng and 
Mak, 2003). To reduce those problems, companies 
are expected to disclose more information. 
Following Rashid (2013), company growth 
(GROWTH) is expressed as a percentage of annual 
change in sales. Market capitalization (CAP) is 
expressed in its natural logarithm. Given that view, 
companies that are highly capitalised usually opt for 
higher CSR disclosure in an attempt to minimise 
public pressure expecting them to be socially 
responsible and the possibility of facing greater 
regulation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Table 3 
summarises the variables in this study. 
 
Table 3. Summary of variables 
 
Variable name Variable acronym Variable type Measurement 
The extent of 
sustainability reporting 
CSRI Dependent 
An unweighted measure of extent of sustainability reporting 
with score of “0” and “1” 
Board activity BFREQUENCY Independent Number of board meeting held for the financial year 
Board independence BIND Control Percentage of non-executive directors to total directors 
Board size BSIZE Control Number of directors on the board 
Directors’ ownership DIROWN Control 
Percentage of shares owned by directors on board to total 
number of shares issued 
Leverage DR Control Total liabilities over total assets 
Liquidity LIQ Control Current assets over current liabilities 
Company age AGE Control Number of years listed on Bursa Malaysia 
Company size SIZE Control Natural logarithm of total assets 
Profitability ROA Control Proportion of profit after tax over total assets 
Growth GROWTH Control Percentage of annual change in sales 
Market capitalization CAP Control Natural logarithm of market capitalization 
5.3. The Model  
 
The following model is estimated based on an 
Ordinary Least Square regression technique to 
examine the relationship between board meeting 
frequency and the extent of CSR reporting of 
Malaysian PLCs: 
 
CSRI
i,t
  = α + 
1
FREQUENCY
i,t
 + 
2
BIND
i,t
 + 
3
BSIZE
i,t
 + 
4
DIROWN
i,t 
+ 
5
DR
i,t
 + 
6
LIQ
i,t 
+ 
7
AGE
i,t
 + 
8
SIZE
i,t
 + 

9
ROA
i,t
 +
10
GROWTH
i,t
+
11
CAP
i,t 
+ 
i,t
 
(2) 
 
Where for ith company at time t CSRI
i,t 
is CSR 
index, FREQUENCY
i,t 
is the natural logarithm of 
number of board meetings, BIND
i,t 
is number of 
independence director to total number of directors, 
BSIZE
i,t 
is the total number of directors, DIROWN
i,t
 is 
percentage of director ownership, DR
i,t 
is debt ratio, 
LIQ
i,t
 is liquidity ratio, AGE
i,t 
is number of listed years 
on Bursa Malaysia, SIZE
i,t 
is natural logarithm of total 
assets, ROA
i,t 
is profitability, GROWTH
i,t 
is the 
company growth in sales, CAP
i,t 
is the market 
capitalization, α is the intercept,  is the regression 
coefficient and  is the error term. 
Prior to analyses, various data testing were 
conducted such as tests of normality, 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and 
endogeneity. Based on Residual Test/Histogram-
Normality Test, data conformed to the assumption. 
Gujarati (2003) suggests that when the correlation is 
greater than 0.8, multicollinearity exists. The 
correlation matrix presented in Table 4 
demonstrates the highest correlation is 0.839 
between company size and market capitalization; 
suggestive of multicollinearity problem. To 
reconfirm the problem, the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) for each independent variable was measured. A 
VIF value exceeding 10 indicates multicollinearity 
(Gujarati, 2003). Nevertheless, VIF values fall below 
10, proving the absence of multicollinearity 
problem. 
To check whether or not homoscedasticity 
assumption is violated, the scatter plot of the 
residuals (ZRESID) against the predicted value 
(ZPRED) of the model is examined. A classic cone-
shaped pattern indicates heteroscedasticity.  
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Further, the Breusch-Pagan test was conducted and 
both the Chi-square and corresponding p value also 
demonstrated heteroscedasticity. To correct it, 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors of the 
White (1980)'s method has been applied. When there 
is a correlation between independent variables and 
the error terms, endogeneity occurs. This causes 
biases in the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression 
coefficients. To overcome this problem, 
Instrumental Variable regression can be employed. 
The F-test for the predicted value of board meeting 
in this model turns out to be insignificant. Following 
Rashid (2014), when CSR index was used as a proxy 
for CSR reporting, F = 10.75 with p = 0.0011. The 
results showed that: (1) endogeneity is not 
problematic; (2) OLS and Instrumental Variable 
regression are consistent.  
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 VIF 
1 BFREQUENCY 1.000           1.105 
2 BIND 0.098** 1.000          1.280 
3 BSIZE 0.098** -0.414** 1.000         1.405 
4 DIROWN -0.018 0.057** -0.089** 1.000        1.056 
5 DR 0.170** 0.044* 0.029 -0.038* 1.000       1.511 
6 LIQ -0.063** 0.009 -0.025 -0.007 -0.508** 1.000      1.369 
7 AGE 0.047* 0.151** -0.011 -0.177** 0.014 -0.018 1.000     1.202 
8 SIZE 0.236** -0.053** 0.339** -0.181** 0.148** -0.101** 0.337** 1.000    4.414 
9 ROA -0.047* -0.009 0.084** -0.073** -0.207** 0.107** 0.051** 0.111** 1.000   1.084 
10 GROWTH -0.037 -0.029 0.025 -0.009 0.048* -0.029 0.000 0.073** 0.039 1.000  1.013 
11 CAP 0.174** -0.063** 0.321** -0.156** -0.067** 0.066** 0.268** 0.839** 0.174** 0.071** 1.000 4.013 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 5. CSR reporting over time 
 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
% % % % % % 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 22.45 22.96 22.71 24.54 24.98 25.75 
Mining 15.69 16.53 16.25 16.53 17.93 20.45 
Manufacturing 19.63 20.55 20.89 21.37 21.73 22.36 
Electricity, Gas & Water Supply 37.65 40 41.57 42.35 42.74 48.63 
Construction 21.4 20.67 21.74 21.01 22.8 24.03 
Wholesale Trade 18.04 18.53 19.41 18.24 19.02 20.79 
Retail Trade 16.86 20 20.2 20 22.16 22.55 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants 28.98 31.59 32.68 31.59 31.59 33.11 
Transport and Storage 19.61 17.65 19.07 20.41 22.28 21.21 
Communication Services 34.17 30.53 35.01 29.69 34.45 36.69 
Property and Business Services 17.24 18.53 18.46 18.73 18.53 19.07 
Health and Community Services 21.81 21.82 24.27 23.53 22.79 26.23 
Overall 20.29 20.91 21.43 21.70 22.34 23.16 
 
6. RESULTS  
 
Based on the content analysis, Table 5 demonstrates 
the trend of CSR reporting by various industries in 
this study. 
Apparently, there is a steady increment of CSR 
reporting over the study period and it is consistent 
with earlier studies (e.g. Mustaffa and Tamoi, 2006; 
Esa and Ghazali, 2012; Haji, 2013). Increased in CSR 
reporting may be attributed to the introduction of 
various incentives and awards (Anas et. al., 2015) as 
well as mandating CSR reporting to PLCs (Haji, 
2013). In addition, a series of corporate governance 
revision is also likely to contribute to the reporting 
increment (Haji, 2013). These revisions which are 
generally aimed at improving the governance 
practices of companies include the emphasis on the 
board meeting.  
The descriptive statistics of CSR reporting and 
the independent variables are displayed in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum SD 
CSRI 0.2167 0.1961 0.0392 0.7255 0.1198 
BFREQUENCY 5.1018 4.9530 2.0138 27.1126 1.3442 
BIND 0.4519 0.4300 0.1700 1.0000 0.1281 
BSIZE 7.2360 6.6859 3.0042 18.1741 1.2960 
DIROWN 0.0438 0.0030 0.0000 0.5680 0.0879 
DR 0.3956 0.3775 0.0030 5.1030 0.2458 
LIQ 2.2001 1.7845 0.0070 10.3760 1.6831 
AGE 13.9782 15.0293 6.0000 52.9845 1.6403 
SIZE (log TA) 12.8784 12.6500 9.3690 18.4110 1.4467 
ROA 0.06192 0.0580 -2.8980 5.5470 0.1782 
GROWTH 0.0533 0.0265 -4.9410 8.5780 0.4777 
CAP (log CAP) 18.7976 18.5030 12.3710 24.8100 1.8112 
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The average CSR reporting level is 21.7%.  This 
indicates that CSR reporting level in Malaysia 
remains moderately low (Lu and Castka, 2009). 
There is a huge difference between the highest and 
the lowest level of reporting; suggesting CSR 
practices in Malaysia generally lacking awareness, 
expectation and standards even though there are 
continuous efforts by the regulators to promote 
CSR.  Culture is also an issue when explaining CSR 
reporting. By and large, transparency and reporting 
are uncommon practices in the Asia (Aaijaz and 
Ibrahim, 2012). The mean of board meeting 
frequency reveals that companies conduct 
approximately 5 meetings per year and a maximum 
of 27 meetings. The result is much lower compared 
to studies by Jallow and Al-Najjar (2012) (7 
meetings), Brick and Chidambaran (2010) and Saiful 
et al. (2007) (8 meetings) and Boyle and Ji (2013) (11 
times). Nevertheless, this finding is in line with 
proponents of board meeting who suggested 
meetings should be handled more frequently to keep 
up with the evolving business environment. Besides, 
more board meetings reflect better monitoring by 
directors. As for board independence, on average, 
the board comprises 45.2%, independent directors. 
This finding demonstrates the company’s trust on 
the capability of independent directors to monitor 
the board effectively and ensuring every decision is 
favourable to shareholders. Although Amran et al. 
(2010)'s study on Malaysia recorded a board with an 
average of 63% independent directors, the result of 
this study still indicates that PLCs in Malaysia are 
consistent with the MCCG recommendation of 
having a board with independent directors 
occupying at least one-third of the seats. On the 
whole, companies have an average board size of 7 
directors, assuming that a moderately large size of 
the board is preferable. Again, this finding is 
comparable to the study of Amran et al. (2010). 
Ownership by directors is surprisingly low with an 
average of 4.4% shares owned by directors while 
large ownership by directors is evident only in 
certain companies.  
To provide evidence on the association of 
advising tendency of the board and CSR reporting, a 
panel data analysis has been performed using an 
OLS regression technique. The adjusted R2 value for 
the model presented in Panel A of Table 7 indicates 
that the disparity in the extent of CSR reporting is 
explainable by the independent variables by a 
considerably high value of 37.6%. H1 expected a 
positive relationship between the frequency of board 
meeting and the extent of CSR reporting. Contrary to 
the expectation, the result in Panel A shows that 
board meeting is negatively related to the level of 
CSR and it is not significant. This result is consistent 
with Haji (2013) also in Malaysia. Although meeting 
frequency has been associated with better company 
performance and higher reporting, it can turn out to 
be less beneficial especially when the meeting is 
filled with work discussion instead of crucial 
agendas that have the potential to increase company 
performance. Opportunities for independent 
directors to exercise meaningful control over 
management are impaired when the meeting 
agendas have been pre-set by chief executive officers 
(Jensen, 1993).Hence, H1 is rejected. 
 
Table 7. Relationship between board meeting frequency and CSR reporting 
 
 
Dependent variable 
Panel A 
(before controlling for industry) 
Panel B 
(after controlling for industry and year) 
CSRI CSRI 
Intercept 
-0.547 -0.559 
(-19.234)*** (-17.277)*** 
BFREQUENCY 
-0.002 -0.007 
(-0.296) (-1.073) 
BIND 
0.033 0.021 
(1.873)* (1.247) 
BSIZE 
0.042 0.029 
(4.570)*** (3.269)*** 
DIROWN 
-0.044 -0.019 
(-1.866)* (-0.820) 
DR 
0.013 0.020 
(1.311) (1.989)* 
LIQ 
-0.000 -0.000 
(-0.548) (-0.292) 
AGE 
0.022 0.026 
(4.636)*** (5.371)*** 
SIZE 
0.026 0.035 
(9.026)*** (12.113)*** 
ROA 
0.061 0.048 
(5.571)*** (4.574)*** 
GROWTH 
-0.001 -0.001 
(-0.281) (-0.289) 
CAP 
0.015 0.001 
(6.620)*** (4.014)*** 
F-statistic 122.667 34.752 
Adjusted R2 0.376 0.461 
The t tests are presented in the parentheses * p< 0.10;  ** p< 0.010;  *** p< 0.001 
Moving on to control variables, independent 
directors, board size, ownership by directors, 
company age, company size, ROA and market 
capitalization are found to be significantly related to 
CSR reporting. Independent directors have the 
ability to effectively monitor management due to its 
independence from the board. This reduces the 
opportunist behaviour of top management, thus 
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increases the level of disclosure. The finding 
reinforces Barako and Brown (2008) and Rashid and 
Lodh (2008). This outcome matches those observed 
in studies by Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) and 
Akhtaruddin et al. (2009). Directors’ ownership 
proves to enhance CSR reporting, similar to the 
findings of Nasir and Abdullah (2004). It supports 
the statement by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that 
director ownership helps in harmonising the 
interests between the directors and the 
shareholders. As predicted, the mature company 
tends to disclose more CSR information to 
demonstrate high reputation. Likewise, larger 
companies have the ability to report more CSR 
activities since costs of disclosures are funded by 
profits (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). Furthermore, 
they are more visible to the public and tend to be 
subject to greater political and regulatory pressures 
from external interest groups (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990). To reduce these (potential) 
political costs, large companies disclose more 
information to demonstrate that their actions are 
legitimate and consistent with good corporate 
citizenship (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). Similarly, 
companies that are highly profitable are able to 
absorb the associated costs, hence disclosing more 
information to the stakeholders. With regard to 
market capitalization, consistent with expectation, 
companies with high market capitalization are likely 
to produce high CSR reporting; conceivably as part 
of their image building exercise. 
 
6.1. Robustness test 
 
Wallace et al. (1994) mentioned that different 
industries may provide a different disclosure level 
because of the unique characteristics of each 
industry. Earlier studies have confirmed a significant 
systematic disparity across industries concerning 
their inclination to make CSR reporting (Brammer 
and Pavelin, 2008). Companies with consumer 
visibility, a high level of political risk or 
concentrated intense competition disclosed 
significantly more CSR information in their annual 
report (Mohd Ghazali, 2007). Following this, it is 
imperative to control the effect of industry on 
reporting activities as the sample in this study 
constitutes of companies from multiple industries. 
Hence, the model was altered by adding INDUSTRY 
dummies. This study uses a two-digit industrial 
classification (SIC) codes to classify the companies. 
To further test the robustness of the results, the 
model has also been controlled for year effect 
through the addition of YEAR dummies. The new 
regression model reads as follows: 
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(3) 
The regression coefficients are shown in 
Panel B of Table 7. As observed, there are some 
slight changes to the results when industry and year 
are controlled. Independent directors have become 
insignificant; supporting Haji (2013). This result 
implies that the effectiveness of independent 
directors in increasing the level of CSR reporting 
might be hampered, plausibly due to lack of 
knowledge and experience in relation to the type of 
industry. Correspondingly directors’ ownership has 
become insignificant. Contrarily, leverage has 
become significant with the inclusion of industry 
and year. This indicates that in certain industries, 
companies with high leverage tend to disclose more 
CSR information. Companies may gain their 
creditors’ confidence by attempting to provide more 
information (Abdullah et. al., 2011). At the same 
time, Esaand Mohd Ghazali (2012) postulate that 
extensive information may help in reducing the cost 
of capital. Nevertheless, board meeting remains to 
be negatively correlated to CSR reporting and 
insignificant. This might suggest that too many 
board meeting can impair company’s level of 
reporting irrespective of industry type. Both board 
meeting and reporting are known to be costly. 
Accordingly, the company might opt for more board 
meeting at the sacrifice of a better level of reporting. 
This finding is consistent with Johl et al. (2013) and 
Vafeas (1999).   
 
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
 
This study examined whether the frequency of 
board meetings is a primary determinant of 
company CSR reporting. 450 listed companies were 
sampled. Inconsistent with expectations, the OLS 
model reveals that board meeting frequency does 
not influence firm CSR reporting. This result 
suggests that company’s level of CSR reporting 
remains indifferent despite the number of board 
meetings held. The result seems to repudiate the 
common belief that resource-rich board of directors 
contributes to better reporting.  
Although board meeting is assumed to be the 
platform to protect shareholders’ interests, it has 
not been well demonstrated in the Malaysian 
context. Vafeas (1999) suggested that board 
meetings should be reactive, rather than proactive 
measures. Companies need to consider how board 
meetings are used. Higher frequency may indicate 
that the company requires many board meetings to 
resolve its problems. The frequency of board 
meeting is seen as only a rough estimation of board 
activity as it does not indicate the work 
accomplished during the meeting (Menon and 
Williams, 1994). Board meeting frequency may also 
be associated insignificantly with the size of the 
board. Larger board size is correlated with longer 
meeting times (Vafeas, 1999). Hence, more board 
meeting does not necessarily mean more decisions 
being taken. Further, Malaysia is known for its 
family-owned companies. It is very common to see 
the same individuals serving as managers and board 
of directors. This results in conflicts and 
inefficiencies in making a strategic decision during 
the board meeting.  
This study attempted to relate frequency of 
board meetings with resource dependence theory. In 
general, companies may not have all the skills and 
expertise needed to operate effectively and 
continuously in an ever-changing environment. To 
accommodate the shortfall, the focus shifted to the 
board of directors. Apart from bringing expertise 
from various fields, directors bring along business 
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contacts and networks which may be relevant 
especially for start-ups and high-growth companies. 
Theoretically, the board of directors should be a set 
of experienced, engaged and helpful advisors who 
can assist the management to focus strategically on 
the business. Ideally, board meetings should be a 
place and time for the directors to provide the most 
help and assistance they can. Yet, based on the 
grounds stated above, directors have failed to 
channel their expertise and network effectively 
through board meetings. Evidently, the finding of 
this study does not lend support to resource 
dependence theory. In closing, the results suggest 
that frequent board meeting fails to provide 
stakeholders with better CSR information. 
Inevitably, embracing good corporate 
governance and upholding transparency at the 
highest value is vital for company’s survival. 
Broadly, board meeting frequency is synonymous 
with increasing board monitoring function. Yet, the 
results here suggest otherwise. In relation to the 
finding of this study, companies might want to 
revise their corporate conduct especially pertaining 
to the board meeting. If the impetus behind 
increased board meeting were simply the need to 
comply with regulation and the fear of shareholders 
litigation, it is likely that increases in board meeting 
will impact negatively on company’s value. Perhaps 
it is better for the company to keep the meeting 
frequency moderately low but not compromising the 
effectiveness. The result also signals the need for 
the authorities to be more stringent in monitoring 
company’s compliance with the corporate 
governance code. It is vital in strengthening the 
reliability and confidence of the shareholders 
towards the role of the board of directors. 
The generalisability of the findings is subject to 
several limitations. Analysis of the annual reports is 
not free from subjective influences. This might 
reduce the reliability of the results. Alternatively, 
future studies may attempt to adopt approaches 
such as questionnaire survey or interviews in order 
to reduce the subjectivity of the annual report 
disclosure analysis. Besides, interviewing board 
members will provide further insights on the effects 
of board characteristics and CSR reporting. Relying 
on the annual report only might be insufficient 
although it has been regarded as the primary source 
of information to stakeholders (Tilt, 2001). 
Therefore, examining other corporate information 
channels is highly recommended. Future research 
may also consider investigating other corporate 
governance attributes such as foreign directors, 
community influential members, CEO duality and 
ownership structure in relation to CSR reporting. 
While these governance attributes may have a 
significant impact on company reporting behaviour, 
they were not included in this study due to word 
restraint. It is also worth investigating the board 
meeting process in determining its quality. Board 
meeting that is run efficiently helps to enhance 
board effectiveness (Saiful et al., 2007). In return, 
companies are able to demonstrate better 
performance. In addition, with the increasing 
importance of CSR reporting, it is essential to ensure 
that CSR reports are sufficient enough to meet 
stakeholders’ information needs and subsequently 
help them hold companies to account. One way of 
doing it is by obtaining their perspectives on the 
issue. While this information may inform the future 
development of CSR reporting practices, O’Dwyer et. 
al. (2005) mentioned that views of non-managerial 
stakeholders are largely absent. Hence, future 
studies may want to carry out surveys on various 
stakeholders to examine the adequacy of CSR 
reporting.  
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